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TICOM/I-143

REPORT ON THE INTERROGATION OF FIVE LEADING
GERMANS AT NUREMBURG ON 27TH SEPTEMBER, 1945.

Attached are the reports of the interrogation of :-

- A. General JODL.
- B. Grand Admiral DOENITZ.
- C. Field Marshal KEITEL.
- D. Herr von RIBBENTROP.
- E. Field Marshal GOERING,

carried out on 27th September, 1945, in Room 164 in the Court-House at Nuremburg by:-

- Commander Dudley-Smith, R.N.,
- Major SEAMAN, U.S. Army.
- Lt. Commander MANSON, U.S.N.R.,
- Major OWEN, I.C., (Interpreter).

Lt. Colonel T.S. HINKEL, U.S. Army, of the Interrogation Division, Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel (Nurnberg), War Crimes Commission, was also present. The detailed arrangements for the interrogation were made by Colonel John K. Amen, U.S. Army, Chief of the Interrogation Division, Nurnberg.

All the prisoners, with the exception of RIBBENTROP, appeared willing to answer to the best of their ability the questions put to them. It was clear to the interrogators that the prisoners found the subject of Signals Intelligence a welcome relief in contrast to that of responsibility for war crimes.

It must be borne in mind that these interrogations required a somewhat different handling from the previous norm of such TICOM procedures. Because of the potential security danger inherent in the forthcoming war guilt trials, when these men will be publicly prosecuted and will speak from the box, it was impossible to exploit them to the full. Many significant "leads" had thus to be neglected by the interrogators.

TICOM
15 October 1945

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The following standard questionnaire was used as general basis for all the interrogations.

- A. How valuable was Sigint to you ?
In what years best ? - poorest ?
What countries and types best ?
- B. To what extent did you control the work programme of the cypher breaking bureau under your orders ?
What was the high level channel of responsibility, from the chief cryptanalyst to yourself ?
Who on your immediate personal staff handled the detail ?
Selected your reading ?
- C. Were there any special series of decodes which received a very restricted distribution ?
- D. Who were the most outstanding cryptanalysts in your bureau ?
- E. What is your opinion of the other crypto bureaux ?
- F. To what extent did a single co-ordinated overall policy for all crypto bureaux exist ?
- G. To what extent did you attempt to bring about closer collaboration ?
- H. What mistakes were made ? In retrospect - what changes would you have instituted to rectify these ?
- I. What do you know of successes in capturing Allied cyphers and cypher machines ?

GENERAL OBERST ALFRED JODL

11.10 a.m.

(Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff.)

1. JODL stated that Sigint certainly provided the most important intelligence available to the German Army. One of the most outstanding examples had been very valuable reports on the war situation in North Africa which were sent to Washington in 1942 by an American military official (who signed himself as Consul but who must have been a Staff Officer) in the Cairo or Suez area. These reports continued for several months during the time of the fighting at Tobruk and at the El Faiza and Halfya Passes. Eventually the key was changed and no further success was obtained. The traffic was taken by a German Army Intercept Unit stationed in Italy. Another example, but of much less importance was the telegrams of the American Minister at Berne, which were read by the Forschungsamt. These contained a considerable amount of intelligence regarding Agents and similar matters but were difficult to interpret.

2. As far as military traffic proper was concerned, the most important item was the working out of Order of Battle. This was particularly important in England before "D. Day", but was mainly obtained, not from deciphered messages, but by Traffic Analysis; similarly, Allied Military Police Networks in France were a very profitable source of Order of Battle information. The intelligence was obtained both from messages in clear and from those which had been broken and decoded, in addition to straightforward Traffic Analysis. Very often messages whose contents in themselves were harmless were of great value.

3. Signals Intelligence, however, provided very little definite information regarding the invasion before "D. Day". They had not much idea where the Schwerpunkt was going to be but thought it would probably be at Cherbourg, with a second attack in the Pas de Calais.

4. From the military point of view their best effort in the early days of the war had been the exploitation of Russian traffic; W/T discipline had been very bad but was later tightened up to the considerable loss of the Germans. British Army W/T discipline was much better and not much had been given away. To begin with the American position was similar to the Russian but greatly improved as the war went on. The W/T discipline of operational troops was generally good and it was the "hangers-on" and rear organisations which provided good results.

5. Not much else was obtained regarding the intentions of the British High Command in North Africa; Agents and F.F.I. traffic between England and France, etc., had been valuable and a good many conclusions had thence been drawn about our intentions, landings, etc. This information was not obtained by cryptanalytic breaking but by D/F'ing the Agent's wireless, rounding-up the man, and capturing his cipher keys. These Agents were often "turned round".

6. In answer to the question whether any other long-term Allied intentions were ever given away, he again mentioned Agents and Maquis traffic before "D. Day" but said that no high level operational traffic was ever obtained. They were sometimes given a general indication but never knew the exact day. Advance information on the Salerno landings (but not the Sicilian ones) was obtained from shipping movements; nothing about the landings in the South of France came to them in advance from Sigint and it was true that none of the major operations of the English and American forces were known to them beforehand from this source.

7. JODL stated that he did not control the work programme of the cryptanalysts and was only concerned with the results produced by the chief of the bureau. He did lay down certain intelligence requirements, but the methods employed, whether Agents, Crypto, etc., were not his concern. The intelligence produced by the Abwehr was the worst to deal with owing to its ambiguity: they often predicted everything, right and wrong, and reported separately each and every possible development. He thought that the Allies originated a lot of deceptive traffic to mislead the German High Command. When the same report came in from several different Agent sources he was always particularly suspicious that it was "planted" by the British Intelligence Service. Sigint on the other hand was always reliable.

8. The intelligence offices Foreign Armies East and Foreign Armies West each combined all sources of available intelligence and sent in their summarised reports every two days. These reports reached him through his Ic (Intelligence Staff Officer), who during the last year and a half had been Oberst KRUMMACHER (had been at school in England); this officer consolidated the reports with any other available sources, e.g. those from the Navy, when they had anything of particular interest. The Navy and G.A.F. were inclined to send their reports direct to HITLER, but JODL had a full composite summary made for him which provided the complete overall picture.

9. If a very special message came in then he received it straight away without waiting for the 48 hourly report; this did not happen very often however, but even so such reports were often wrong; for example, on one occasion a report was sent direct to HITLER by HIMMLER to the effect that there had been a landing of strong English forces on the Dalmation coast. HITLER rang up JODL and there was general consternation. It eventually turned out to be a bad report which had come from an Agent via Vienna and actually related to a small Commando raid on an island which had already taken place some days before and which had been wiped out immediately. He took steps to prevent such alarmist reports being circulated in future before they had received proper correlation by Ic.

10. He knew of no special series of decodes which received very restricted distribution; all distribution was the same, i.e. to the General Staffs of the Army, G.A.F. and Navy; only if they were of economic interest did they have additional circulation.

11. He did not know the names of any cryptanalysts, but stated that the Chi Stelle of the Army was to some extent technically under the Abwehr.

12. JODL said he was unable to discriminate between the efficiency of the different German cryptanalytic bureaux, all of them were good and he was very satisfied with the whole output. The Army were probably best but the OKW were very good. He did not receive the products of the Foreign Office bureau (located at GRÜNEWELD) which went straight to the Foreign Minister. He knew that they broke some political traffic since he heard of it indirectly at military lectures, etc; he remembered references to Greek, Yugoslav and other Balkan States; exiled Governments in London communicating with their own countries and often revealing considerable differences of political opinion; the Turkish Ambassador in London; and a certain amount of Polish. He knew of no Dutch or Belgian material.

13. He knew little about the RLM/Forschungsamt; it was a large office and efficiently organised, but since it was GOERING's special affair he only knew about it from conversation and indirect hearsay. There seemed to him to be a great deal of duplication going on. The results were sent to KEITEL who passed on to JODL in a special folder such items as he thought would interest him; JODL returned these when he had read them.

14. As regards OKW/Chi, particularly valuable reports came straight to him, but the decodes normally went first to Foreign Armies West and East. JODL was greatly in favour of the concept of one intelligence office receiving everything, although this was in fact only partly realised. After 1942 however, when the Fuehrer took over the command of the Eastern Armies, JODL had nothing further to do with Foreign Armies East; both offices were always adjacent, at BERLIN and at ZOSSEN, and there was close collaboration between the two. The head of Foreign Armies East, Oberstlttn. SCHEIBE, had been captured by the British at FLENSBURG.

15. He knew little of the cryptanalytic side of the G.A.F.; there was a very good Ic organisation who issued consolidated fortnightly reports, well illustrated with sketches and plans. He was doubtful whether a centralised Luftwaffe Chi Stelle existed in the Reich.

16. Earlier in the interrogation JODL had stated that Germany had not found out much about the British Navy, whose "disguise was very good", but when questioned specifically about OKM/4SKL III, he said that he believed them to be quite efficient; they had had the longest experience in the work and were very good at dealing with matters such as ship movements, but did not go in for the same amount of detail as did the Army. He knew that when U-boat Commanders reported their sinkings, OKM checked up the truth of their reports with 4 SKL III and that in general the two tallied.

17. No single co-ordinated overall policy for signals intelligence existed. Each bureau worked for itself but probably they discussed their experiences with one another. There was unfortunately a certain amount of duplication in many cases. He himself had succeeded in co-ordinating the intelligence effort between the Wehrmacht and the three services as from 1943, but the Forschungsamt had stayed out. On the general intelligence evaluation level he had periodic discussion with the chief of the Abwehr. There was no technical cryptanalytic co-ordination.

18. JODL thought that Allied ciphers had probably been captured early in 1940, at DUNKIRK. No captures had ever been reported specifically to him, but he knew that at the time of the first German clash with an English brigade in Norway, cipher material and keys had been obtained but that the keys were changed straight away. He thought that nothing of particular advantage to the High Command was captured in North Africa, only the systems of lower formations. He could not remember ever hearing of cipher machines being captured.

GROSSADMIRAL KARL DOENITZ

11.45 a.m.

(Commander in Chief of the Navy, and latterly, Reichschancellor)

19. DOENITZ stated emphatically that Sigint had been very valuable to him. It had been the best source of Naval Intelligence, and indeed, when air recce, etc., were not available, had often been the only source of operational information. It had been at its best in the Summer of 1942 but had greatly deteriorated after then.

20. In 1942 and earlier years the Allies had kept the same keys in force for a long time, but from some time in 1943 the keys were changed much more frequently; it was essential to possess a certain minimum quantity of messages on any one key in order to achieve cryptanalytic success, and these conditions ceased to obtain; just as his bureau was on the point of getting a break-in, the key would be changed and the work had to start all over again.

21. In 1942 Signals intelligence concerning convoy operations in the Atlantic had been of the highest order. At that time DOENITZ considered that the allied procedure of keeping successive convoys on the same routes was very bad; he had been told that Mr. Churchill had in the Autumn of 1942 dismissed the operational staffs concerned; he himself had noticed a very marked difference after that time in

the organisation of convoy operations. After some time in 1943 the German Naval Signals Intelligence Service had no success at all as far as matters of real strategic importance were concerned, despite very considerable efforts, including the double banking of intercept stations. This situation continued until the end of the war. He was unable to discriminate between successes with British, American and Combined Anglo-American systems.

22. From a practical point of view, Traffic Analysis had proved to be of very little use; they had been able to draw certain conclusions from it but these were not hard and fast and were generally unsatisfactory. Direction finding was employed but had not proved itself a very important source of intelligence. He emphasised the difference between the detailed and exact information regarding convoy rendezvous, etc. in 1942 and the vague conclusions from Traffic Analysis which were subsequently available.

23. During their period of great success in 1942, he had held the post of Admiral Commanding U-boats, and the control of the work programme of the Cipher Bureau would then have been from OKM in Berlin; when later he became Commander in Chief of the Navy, the situation had changed and nothing important was being broken, the technical staff had been increased in size but to no avail; when the experts were no longer successful it was impossible for him as a layman to solve their difficulties; he had naturally become less interested in their activities when nothing important was being read. While he was BDU he had a "B-Dienst" teleprinter from Berlin to his Headquarters on the Biscay coast. Korvettenkapitän MECKEL, a member of his personal staff, handled the material for him in 1942.

24. DOENITZ knew of no special series of decodes receiving a restricted distribution. He himself did not see the reports of other bureaux such as OKW/Chi.

25. He considered Korvettenkapitän TEUBNER to be the most outstanding professional cryptographer of the "B-Dienst"; this officer had spent all his life on this type of work, he had about 600 people on his staff at OKM in Berlin. They were largely mathematical experts "who concerned themselves with permutations and combinations." Dr. TARNOW (sic) was another first class cryptanalyst.

26. DOENITZ stated that he had no knowledge whatsoever regarding the Crypto Bureaux of the other services and departments. He had never heard of OKH/In 7/VI and had no information on the OKL organisation; such matters, he said, were of no interest to him. In answer to the question whether there was a close liaison between the Navy and the Luftwaffe on Sigint matters, he stated that he hoped there had been between the technicians, but that was no concern of his. As for the Civil Bureaux, he had never tried to find out, they were of no use to him.

27. When asked what alterations might have been made to better the Naval Sigint Service, he replied that he would not have changed it. Perhaps in 1942 he might have put more people on to the work in order to break in even more quickly; this perhaps might have resulted in their being less put out by the introduction of more frequent changes of allied keys. In all, about 1000 men were employed on purely cryptanalytic duties. When, in 1943, no results were being obtained, it was suggested that such a large staff was not justified. He, however, intended to increase the staff and called in TEUBNER and MECKEL to discuss the matter. They explained that such a step would be futile since it was no good playing about unless there were an essential minimum number of messages available on any one key.

28. DOENITZ stated that there had been no successes in capturing Allied systems. They would very much have liked to have had them, especially in 1943 when things were getting sticky, but in actual fact although a considerable effort was made, none were ever obtained. He stated that no Allied cipher machines had ever been captured so far as he knew.

29. This prisoner was not, in any sense, uncooperative, but of all the five interviewed he was the most crisp - that is, he seldom dilated upon a question put to him, as though continually on guard lest questions seemingly of a technical nature might in fact be a trap and commit him to discussion of strategic or political subjects. In this guardedness he was the antithesis of GOERING and KEITEL.

GENERALFELDMARSCHALL WILHELM KEITEL.

14.10 p.m.

(Chief of the Wehrmacht)

30. KEITEL stated that German Signals Intelligence successes had only been intermittent. As far as the Army were concerned their best intelligence had been from this source, even though at times it was only derived from Traffic Analysis and not from cipher breaking. For example, when keys were changed and breaking was no longer possible for the time and direct intelligence from texts of cipher messages ceased to be available, they were often able to draw useful strategic conclusions from Traffic Analysis. Russian military traffic had been the most easy to follow and English the most difficult. The Russian wireless discipline on certain parts of the front did however improve as the war went on and especially at times when important operations were impending.

31. The organisation of cryptanalytic effort was such that the Head of Wehrmacht Signals (WNW) was also in control of the Army organisation, and in addition had a co-ordinating influence over all the bureaux. Chief WNW was General der Nachrichtentruppen PRAUN, his predecessor had been General FELLGIEBEL, now dead. The officer who carried out the actual duties of co-ordinator for all three services had been Generalleutnant THIELE, who was succeeded by Generalleutnant GIMBORN.

32. KEITEL said that he knew very little about the diplomatic side of the work carried out by OKW/Chi, but that General PRAUN would know the details. The organisation had a number of fixed intercept stations which had been in existence before the war, they took various fixed services W/T traffic, such as that between the United Kingdom and the Balkans. The OKW/Chi personnel were drawn from all three services, as PRAUN in addition to his double function of working both for OKW and OKH, was also in close contact with OKM and with the Luftwaffe, and drew personnel from them.

33. The peak years for Signals Intelligence had been 1941 and 1942; the most outstanding success was, he thought, the obtaining of General ALEXANDER's plans and intentions in North Africa through the reading of the telegrams of the American Liaison Officer (or Mission) attached to General ALEXANDER's staff. He thought that this source had only lasted for two or three weeks. He remembered that traffic between the United States and Turkey had been especially valuable, but he could not remember whether it was American or Turkish traffic; however General PRAUN would know. He could not recollect any further outstanding examples other than certain unspecified successes with Russian traffic.

34. He himself had not controlled the work programme of OKW/Chi, or at least he had only done so to a very small extent. He and JODL formulated general intelligence requirements, but General THIELE (and later GIMBORN) had passed more detailed instructions to PRAUN and FELLGIEBEL. THIELE had been an outstanding man, he was very efficient and had carried out these duties better than anyone else. OKW/Chi also had various monitoring commitments for German service communications, both from the point of view of cipher security and for keeping a check on W/T discipline.

35. KEITEL's sigint reading matter was selected for him by the Head of the Chi Stelle of OKW who sent him a daily package of reports which contained about half an hour's reading matter. He picked out all the more important ones and marked them with a cross for JODL to see, JODL returned them to him in due course. These OKW/Chi reports were all marked "VN" in red; he did not know the meaning of the initials. VN's had an extremely restricted distribution and a review of their distribution list was made every six months in order to keep it as small as possible. He did not know what the distribution was, but it certainly included the heads of the services. In addition to the VN's there were various other more general reports based on Signals Intelligence, for example Abwehr Amt Ausland (Abwehr Intelligence H.Q., Berlin) acted as a collecting point and evaluation centre for intelligence from all sources and issued routine reports. A marked distinction was always made in Germany between the technical side of intelligence production (e.g. interception and cryptanalysis, operating of agents, etc.) and the collation and evaluation of the Intelligence thereby obtained.

36. He was unable to name any outstanding cryptanalysts and could not even remember the name of the head of OKW/Chi. At the time when the shortage of manpower became acute and the authorities were calling for drastic reductions in the number of personnel, he had insisted that this should not apply to the staff of OKW/Chi, as this type of specialists was very hard to replace. Experience had shown that women and girls were particularly good at this work, especially girls who had received University training and had specialised in mathematics.

37. KEITEL knew nothing of Pers ZS, the Foreign Office Bureau, other than that he himself had put a few people at the disposal of RIBBONTROP for this purpose at the outbreak of the war. The German Foreign Office were extremely secretive and jealous about anything their bureau produced; RIBBONTROP always wanted to keep it strictly to himself. If, by any chance, KEITEL produced direct to HITLER an OKW/Chi diplomatic decode, and did not pass it via the Foreign Office they became extremely annoyed. Actually this only happened very rarely, in general if it was known that a message decoded by OKW/Chi was not also in the hands of the Foreign Office, then a copy of the VN was passed to them. It was only in very exceptional circumstances that KEITEL handed anything of a political nature direct to HITLER. At the twice-daily meetings when military affairs were discussed all the important new items were mentioned, JODL bringing up the military ones, and so on. In actual fact HITLER generally knew of them already through his own personal intelligence liaison officers, and information staff.

38. KEITEL described the RLM/Forschungsamt as the "third competitor". He used to receive some of their so-called "Brown Reports" but was never able to fathom the special and rather mysterious selection which had been made specially for him; it appeared to him to be on an erratic and irrational basis.

39. Of the three bureaux who worked on diplomatic systems, he thought that OKW/Chi was probably the best, he could not be quite certain since he did not see many of the products of the other two. In peace-time each had had its special field to cover, the Forschungsamt domestic political matters, and the Foreign Office diplomatic affairs; but once the war started they all grabbed at everything and there was a great deal of duplication. KEITEL said that before the war he had tried to institute an arrangement to prevent this, but the war had begun before he had achieved anything and action was then almost impossible. Before the war he had endeavoured to arrange that all this type of work should be concentrated in one single office and under one authority. Both GOERING and RIBBENTROP were completely against any such suggestion and would not hear of its implementation. KEITEL added that in any case he himself would not willingly have given up his own bureau if a proposal had been made to concentrate all cryptanalytic work under the auspices of the Foreign Office. Nevertheless, under war conditions some sort of mutual assistance on technical and practical levels had existed and there was also a limited exchange of intelligence. KEITEL said that he had never opposed in any way this exchange and mutual assistance, there was no question of prestige so far as he was concerned.

40. When questioned about the Chi Stelle of the Luftwaffe he disclaimed any detailed knowledge but said that PRAUN would know. He thought the organisation was an efficient one as General MARTINI, an old Army man whom he knew to be good, was in charge. MARTINI kept in very close contact with Chef WNW. A healthy spirit of competition existed between the three services; there was a full exchange of appropriate intercepted traffic which was effected via Chef WNW who passed the material to OKW/Chi who were the clearing-house. The Foreign Office and Forschungsamt remained outside and independent but otherwise a fair measure of cooperation existed.

41. The only information KEITEL could give on 4 SKL III, the Naval Bureau, was that they were excellent at their job and had a first class staff. The Navy had possessed a very good Signals Intelligence Organisation in peace-time and they had the advantage of having a larger number of experienced personnel than did the Army. During the course of the various campaigns of the war the Army had lost in action many of its senior and more valuable signals personnel; this was because the Army had a greater requirement for keeping a number of Sigint units well forward. The Luftwaffe enjoyed similar conditions to the Navy in this respect.

42. As regards the capture of Allied ciphers, KEITEL said that a large number of Russian systems had fallen into their hands, a few American ones, and a certain amount of English material in North Africa and in Greece during ROMMEL's campaign in 1942. He thought that the latter must have been forward unit material and unimportant, but he could make no conclusive statement and PRAUN would know more accurately. He had heard that cipher machines had been captured but pointed out that a captured machine, as such, was no use at all without the keys. He thought that British cipher machines must undoubtedly have been taken at the time of DUNKIRK and probably in Africa and in Crete, but could give no details. In any case they never provided any sensational results.

HERR JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP1515 p.m.

(Minister of Foreign Affairs)

43. RIBBENTROP stated that when he took over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1938 he discovered that practically nothing existed in the way of a political intelligence organisation, there were various unsubstantial connections in various countries abroad but they did not amount to much and only about 30 or 40 people were employed on intelligence within the Ministry. Nearly everything was in the hands of the S.S. and the Wehrmacht; this was unfortunate because everything went direct to HITLER and there was no central clearing house. The Intelligence Section of the SD, which had perhaps handled the bulk of political intelligence, had been successively under the control of HEYDRICH, HIMMLER and KALTENBRUNNER.

44. The Foreign Office Cryptanalytic Bureau Pers. ZS., was under Herr SELCHOW who had been engaged on this work during the first World War. Exactly how Pers. ZS was organised RIBBENTROP did not know, unfortunately he had been pre-occupied with a multitude of affairs and had been unable to devote as much time to this side of the work as perhaps he should have done. SELCHOW, he knew, liaised closely with the RLM/Forschungsamt, the organisation which produced the "Brown Reports".

45. He knew that Pers ZS were able to decipher diplomatic traffic continually. They only read the easier English codes and never had any success with the high grade ones; he was uncertain whether they had any success with Russian (at first he said they did and later contradicted himself); they sometimes read U.S.A. telegrams but this success was only occasional. They exploited the Italian traffic all the time, and Turkish to a very considerable extent; he thought, but was not certain, that the telegrams of some of the South American Republics were also decoded. He pointed out that when a cypher was changed it often took quite a long time, 3 or 6 or 12 months, before they managed to read the telegrams again.

46. On being asked how valuable Signals Intelligence was to him and which countries provided the best material he hesitated for a very long time; the value of this intelligence did not amount to very much - HITLER had a queer, rather particular, view about it - he did not like this type of intelligence very much and said it was unreliable and often misleading, it was better to use one's own common-sense. RIBBENTROP said that occasionally a really important piece of intelligence was produced, but even when pressed he said he could not recollect a single specific example.

47. The selection of decodes for his own personal reading was made by Inspektor SCHMIDT; he only saw between one and four items a day, perhaps it was even less.

48. His instructions to PERS ZS were that they should decipher everything they could; very occasionally a specific request might be made, but for the most part they were only given this general directive - they had to use their own judgement. Some of the decodes were passed to the services; any that were really important to other departments were distributed to them at once; his principal assistant, van STEENGRACHT, or an Under-Secretary of State, determined what distribution should be made outside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; van STEENGRACHT also drew RIBBENTROP's attention to certain items.

49. He stated that the RLM/Forschungsamt covered precisely the same field as PERS ZS and there was unfortunately almost complete duplication. The Forschungsamt produced their decodes more quickly than the Foreign Office but their texts were far less clear and tended to be inaccurate. Originally work on diplomatic ciphers had been centralised in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but the Forschungsamt had taken on a lot of this work for themselves a number of years before RIBBENTROP's time.

50. SELCHOW had maintained a liaison on technical matters with OKW/Chi and probably compared notes with them; there was also some sort of technical exchange between OKW/Chi and the Forschungsamt.

51. There was, he was sure, no overall coordination of policy for the various German Cryptanalytic Bureaux (he did not know how many there were in all); he was afraid that in this respect the higher policy was not well directed. He himself had had occasional talks with those concerned with a view to preventing all this double work, but nothing had resulted.

52. He was unable to give an opinion of the efficiency of OKW/Chi; he did not even receive their reports and he only saw between one and three of the "Brown Report" decodes every day. When asked whether he considered the existence of so many bureaux to be desirable, he stated that it would have been very much more advisable to concentrate the effort under one head, but things had gone awry. In consequence of the existing situation, he himself did not receive certain items which were available and which would have been of value to him. He said "I think it possible that I made an effort once to have intelligence as a whole co-ordinated", but that as the system in force was for every one to go privately and direct to HITLER, it was scarcely worth trying. He thought it possible that at one time he might have made a certain amount of effort to bring about closer cooperation with the services in this sphere, but was not sure whether in fact he had actually done so.

53. Without interpolation, it is almost impossible to give the flavour of the above interrogation. The prisoner appeared grossly ignorant of the material under discussion; this difficulty was further complicated by a grandiose and world-weary manner superimposed on a natural slyness, and by an anxiety neurosis presumably resulting from his present circumstances. By way of general interest, it should be added that this was the only interrogation carried out in English; but even this advantage failed to redeem the proceedings.

REICHSMARSCHALL HERMANN GOERING

1600 p.m.

(Commander in Chief of the Air Force, Minister for Air, etc.)

54. GOERING said that Signals Intelligence had been of very great value, and particularly so as regards the products of the RLM/Forschungsamt. He had personally founded the Forschungsamt in 1933; it had never in actual fact been part of the Luftwaffe or of the RLM, but as some sort of camouflage was desirable for an organisation of this nature it had been nominally attached to the German Air Ministry for purposes of "cover". In 1933 he had discovered to his astonishment that no organisation existed within the Reich to deal with cryptanalysis on anything approaching a broad and general basis.

In its early days the Forschungsamt had covered all fields of traffic - economic, political, diplomatic, private, military, etc.

55. The work of the Forschungsamt comprised two almost completely separate activities, firstly that of telephone monitoring, and secondly that of interception and cryptanalysis. As regards the first commitment, this had originally been limited to listening to telephone conversations to and from Foreign Embassies and those of important visiting foreigners - in order to obtain political and economic intelligence. At a later date HITLER laid down that all telephone monitoring was to be GOERING's responsibility, as far as he remembered this was at the end of 1933; hitherto internal telephone monitoring had been handled by the police. Inevitably the Reichspost were also concerned for a while, since their co-operation and assistance were necessary for working out the technical side and for arranging special connections; the Forschungsamt dispensed with as much of this liaison as possible as soon as they found their feet. It was laid down that the Post Office had to obtain a specific permit from the Forschungsamt if for any reason they wished to carry out monitoring themselves; later on, however, the Gestapo intruded themselves into the business and worked independently and without authorisation from GOERING, they worked clandestinely for their own purposes; he thought it extremely probable that latterly all his own personal telephone conversations had been monitored by them. The fact remained, however, that, by and large, the Forschungsamt had done practically all the telephone monitoring in Germany.

56. The study of the Transatlantic (London/Washington) scrambled telephone was not a commitment of the Forschungsamt, it was done by the Post Office. He knew nothing of the "special secret process" employed or how it was broken down. He had heard that a conversation between Mr. CHURCHILL and President ROOSEVELT had been obtained and also important conversations regarding the capitulation of Italy. He did not know whether these conversations passed by wireless or by cable.

57. When asked what he knew of German successes in tapping submarine cables he stated that, of course, various under-sea cables had been tapped; he did not know where, when, or how this had been done, but reiterated that the work had definitely been carried out. He pointed out that one does not actually have to "tap" a cable in order to get results, it was only necessary to get near to it, but he had no technical knowledge of the subject. He thought that the work had been done by the Reichspost although it was not impossible that the Forschungsamt itself might have been directly concerned.

58. He was very satisfied with the Forschungsamt, which was a first-class organisation employing the very best cryptanalytic staff and with intercept arrangements for taking all available traffic. He thought that they were able to deal with 32 different languages. The virtue of the organisation lay in the fact that they did not confine themselves to any particular field of intelligence and had no political axe to grind, nor ideology to follow; they were just given the technical requirements to intercept and break traffic, and to disseminate intelligence. When they made an intelligence resumé of some particular subject, for example, that of aircraft production in the U.S.A., or the YALTA and TEHERAN Conferences, they produced an accurate factual account with no political bias. Reports such as these, often covering quite considerable periods, were frequently produced.

59. GOERING's main principle had always been to keep the Forschungsamt free from outside influences; Admiral CANARIS, the

Gestapo, and the Foreign Office had continually tried to interfere but he had managed to head them off. At one time the head of the Forschungsamt had formed the idea that they should also deal with agents' traffic - GOERING had found this out in about 1934 and had strictly forbidden any such action; such matters should be the concern of the Secret Service, and in any case the intelligence was generally unreliable.

60. GOERING said that the recipients of the daily bulletins, the "Brown Sheets" (Braunblätter), always emphasised the quality and reliability of the service. In 1940 and 1941 the selected file of reports which was passed to him daily contained as much as two hours reading. This file included intelligence from both types of Forschungsamt source, he was unable to say what proportion consisted of decodes.

61. He was unable to give examples of any particularly outstanding items of intelligence obtained from decodes; he remembered that the American Minister in BERNE was very garrulous and sent extremely long messages. On being asked which countries provided the most valuable intelligence, he said, England, France, Russia, U.S.A., Poland, and so on, it varied with the situation - they read everything - they covered all countries - their achievements were global (sic); the Far East was no exception - China, the Japanese Ambassador in BERLIN reporting home, and so on. He pointed out that it often happened that when something particularly important was impending, special cipher keys or a change of the existing keys, were introduced.

62. The intelligence resulting from decoded telegrams was not always useful, they often consisted of absolute rubbish; the extent to which the members of the Diplomatic Corps spread and retailed fantastic rumours was surprising. He himself had often made arrangements to have rumours planted and within a few days he observed them being passed on and spreading. Another commitment of the Forschungsamt was the interception of the Broadcasting Services of foreign countries, in order to obtain information from political speeches, propaganda broadcasts, etc. This work was also done by other organisations, but here again the Forschungsamt was by far the best; in fact, they took and exploited everything that was going on the air on every wave-length.

63. The Forschungsamt did not deal with purely military traffic; the bureaux of the Army, Navy and Air Force were independent but maintained contact with the Forschungsamt through liaison officers; this was necessary, inter alia, because there was an exchange of intercepted traffic and the Forschungsamt had to know what the others were picking up. He stated that in the case of systems which were being worked on by several different bureaux, it sometimes happened that one of the services might get in more quickly than the rest, but that in general the Forschungsamt had by far the greatest ability of the lot. In such cases results were exchanged; there was a spirit of healthy competition.

64. He did not control the work programme of the cryptanalysts; they had a general directive to take everything and to read everything; further detailed direction was left to the head of the Forschungsamt. If it was a question of needing additional staff they applied to State Secretary KOERNER, who also dealt with all their higher administrative matters. The first head of the Forschungsamt had been Kapitänleutnant SCHIMPF, he had been succeeded by Prince Christoph von HESSEN, who had eventually returned to the Luftwaffe; the post had then been taken over by Herr SCHAPPER who had always belonged to the

organisation and who was probably the best technical man of the whole lot. GOERING used to visit them only once every year because the organisation worked so well on its own. The high level channel of responsibility was from SCHAPPER to KOERNER and from him to the Reichsmarschall himself.

65. Certain reports existed which were only sent to GOERING and to HITLER; it depended on the subject and the existing circumstances; some of them might be subsequently passed by HITLER to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Typical examples were the BERLIN--ROME telephone conversations between MUSSOLINI and CIANO.

66. HITLER's view of the products of the Forschungsamt was that they were very reliable*; the material had to be presented factually to HITLER with no argument nor appreciation, only the verbatim conversation or actual deciphered text. Editors were given very definite orders not to make guesses where there were gaps; if any portion was missing or was not clear, a row of dots had to be inserted and the appreciation, if any, inserted within parentheses. There was a special courier service with particular despatch boxes of which only GOERING, HITLER, and RIBBENTROP possessed the keys. The couriers had to travel in special motorcars and not in railway trains. All the reports had to be returned, and sometimes there were difficulties because odd single sheets had been extracted and retained. In such cases a reminder was sent out asking for the missing sheet. There were special security regulations to prevent the reports being handed on from person to person.

67. GOERING said that he had no great opinion of the ability of OKW/Chi or of Section Pers. ZS of the Foreign Office, the other two bureaux who worked on civil cyphers; the Forschungsamt who always achieved the most rapid and efficient breaking had a very close liaison with Pers. ZS to avoid unnecessary duplication. He did not know what the relations with OKW/Chi were, he was much too busy to take much interest in this, the most junior member of the family; he thought they did not concern themselves very much with diplomatic traffic but studied tactical and military problems with which the Forschungsamt did not bother themselves. He only received copies of OKW/Chi decodes now and again.

68. The cryptanalytic bureau of the Luftwaffe, Chi Stelle Ob.d.L. was directly subordinated to him and had been successful; they concentrated on all kinds of direction-finding and route tracking, etc., in connection with allied air raids. The G.A.F. Funkhorch-Regiment-West in France, commanded by Hauptmann RUCKHEIM who was an exceptional man, had been especially important; this officer passed him situation reports every evening at about 6 p.m. over a direct private line. A good deal of information was derived from the study of R/T and it was possible to recognise the voices of individual pilots. GOERING himself had listened once for half an hour and had been astonished at the amount of talking that went on.

69. When asked what successes were achieved with high grade allied air cyphers, GOERING stated that they had largely concentrated on operational traffic but that strategic traffic was broken. The only example he could give of the latter was of their having learned in advance of the flight of a unit of the United States air forces over Germany and thence to Poltava in Russia. The advance intelligence gave them the day but not the precise place where they were going to land in Russia; the Luftwaffe therefore followed them in, on the same night a German bomber force strafed them heavily on the ground at Poltava, causing heavy American losses.

* cf. para 46 for entirely conflicting statement on this head made by RIBBENTROP.

70. The chain of command from Chi Stelle Ob.d.L. was through General MARTINI to the Chief of the General Staff; he did not know who was in charge under MARTINI. He also had his direct contact with Hauptmann RUCKHEIM, already mentioned; even in the middle of the night, if operations were on, he could ring up RUCKHEIM and obtain the very latest information on the position; this enabled GOERING to break in personally on the conduct of any operation at any time; for example, when his staff said that the raiders were going for Berlin, he might have more up to date intelligence direct from RUCKHEIM and could say "No, they are going for Stettin". His Adjutants - the officers appointed to this post were numerous - received reports from all sources and passed them on to him, wherever he was, by means of a loudspeaker broadcast system.

71. GOERING said he knew nothing about the activities of the cryptanalytic bureau of the Navy, and added the comment that the navies of all countries were rather exclusive. If the Navy ever passed them intelligence it was about three months old; the Navy kept largely to themselves and held things back. Conversely, however, the Luftwaffe kept the Navy currently informed and there was proper liaison on their part. He did not remember ever having received a message of real strategic value from the Navy, although TIRPITZ was the first to ask the Air Force for information and help when he was in trouble. On a low level there was better liaison between the two services and tactical information was exchanged. There had been an occasion when they had sunk one of their own destroyers by mistake in consequence of a lack of proper cooperation over signals intelligence.

72. Collaboration with OKH In 7/VI was better than that with the Navy; he had no opinion as to the ability of the Army bureau, and he never received copies of their decodes as such. There was close liaison between the Ic's of the Army and the Air Force, but he did not think that the actual sources of intelligence came into the matter.

73. There was, he said no overall policy whatsoever for coordinating the activities of the various cryptanalytic bureaux; with the exception of the Forschungsamt whose work was magnificent and completely global ["Ausgezeichnet! Ganz global!!"], they all had their own specialised tasks & problems; the relevant bureau dealt with its own special kind of traffic, and there was the liaison he had already mentioned. When asked whether he had made any effort to improve the liaison between the Navy and the Luftwaffe, he said that sometimes the liaison was very good, for example the Navy had once tipped them off about the position of a Murmansk convoy and the Luftwaffe had wiped it out.

74. Allied cyphers were regularly captured, he said; ordinary operational keys were being picked up all the time, particularly from crashed aircraft. The cyphers of the French Foreign Office at the Quai d'Orsay had been obtained but he did not know the details. Cypher machines were, of course, also captured, in the same way as the allies captured German ones, but he had no details, it was not his business.

75. GOERING's use of the phrase "ganz global" in describing the scope of the Forschungsamt is characteristic of his bombastic and possessive attitude about the organization. Since it was his brain-child, it was, of course, superb. By contrast with certain others of the interrogations, the expansiveness of this prisoner was such that very little prompting produced copious results.